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Abstract. Security in computer networks is a very complex task especially if it is re-
quired to separate a corporate network from public Internet or to divide a company’s
intranet into multiple zones with different security requirements. The network se-
curity policy that describes these security requirements is primarily presented in
a high-level form. Also, the security policy is enforced using some low-level secu-
rity mechanisms, mainly firewall technology. One of the main difficulties faced by
the network administrator is how to translate the high-level policy description to
the low-level firewall rule-base. This paper presents Role-Based Network Security
(RBNS) model that can be used as an intermediary level between high-level po-
licy form and low-level firewall rule-base. We use the Role-Based Access Control
(RBAC) model as a framework for our proposed RBNS model. The main concept
of RBNS model is that network services are assigned to roles and hosts are made
members of appropriate roles thereby acquiring the roles’ network services. Also,
the paper presents a compilation algorithm that can be used to automatically gene-
rate the low-level firewall rule-base from the RBNS intermediary-level. The paper
presents a proposed verification algorithm to prove that the high-level policy and
the translated low-level firewall rule-base are equivalent. Based on the RBNS model,
we design and implement a firewall management toolkit. The paper demonstrates
in brief the toolkit’s capabilities through an example, thus showing that the using of
this model separates the high-level security policy from the underlying enforcement
∗ This work was supported by Slovak Science Grant Agency No. VG 1/0157/03 “Me-
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mechanism. This separation offers easier management and debugging of low-level
firewall rule-base at an appropriate level of abstraction.
Keywords: Network security, security modeling, security policy, firewall manage-
ment, packet filtering, router access lists
1 INTRODUCTION
Security of networks has become one of the primary concerns when it is required
to connect a private network to the Internet or even to isolate a particular subnet
from the overall corporate network. To provide the required level of protection, an
organization needs a security policy to prevent unauthorized users from accessing
resources on the private network and to protect against the unauthorized export of
private information. Even if an organization is not connected to the Internet, it may
still need to establish an internal security policy to manage users’ access to portions
of the network and protect sensitive or secret information [1, 2]. This security policy
is primarily presented in a high-level form. An example of high-level service-specific
policy is described in [3].
In a network security policy, the security policy concentrates on controlling net-
work access to hosts and services. In this case, firewall technology is the main
security mechanism that can be used to enforce the security policy [4, 5, 6, 7]. The
single most important factor of firewall’s security is how the network administra-
tor configures it. However, while firewalls themselves have been some impressive
technological advances, firewall configuration and management seem to be lagging
behind [8].
Let us go briefly over the reasons that make firewall management a difficult
task. A firewall is typically placed on a gateway, separating the corporate Intranet
from the public Internet. Most of today’s firewalls are configured via a rule-base.
This rule-base instructs the firewall, which inbound packets to let pass and which
to block. Also, it specifies which outbound packets are allowed. The administrator
needs to implement the high-level corporate security policy with this low-level rule-
base.
Typically, the configuration interface allows the security administrator to define
various host-groups and service-groups. A single rule typically includes a source,
a destination, a service-group, and an appropriate action [6]. The source and des-
tination are host-groups, while the action is either “pass” or “drop”. From this
description, it is obvious that the security of whole Intranet depends on the exact
content of the rule-base, with no higher level of abstraction available.
This problem becomes worse for a medium- or large-sized company that uses
more than a single firewall. These firewalls divide the company’s departments into
multiple zones. In this case the security policy is typically realized by multiple rule-
bases located on multiple gateways that connect the different zones to each other.
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Thus the interplay between these rule-bases must be carefully examined so as not
to introduce security holes.
To solve these problems, we presented a network security model, which acts as an
intermediary level between high-level security policy and low-level firewall rule-base
(Figure 1).
High-Level Security Policy 
RBNS Model 
Low-Level Firewall Rule-Base 
Fig. 1. RBNS model as intermediary level
1.1 Big Picture of the Problem
The problem of firewall management has a similar flavor to access control problem
in the sense that the definition of firewall rules can be considered as an assignment
process of some services (corresponding to permissions in access control problem)
to IP addresses (corresponding to users in access control problem). This similarity
led us to choose RBAC model, a generalized approach to access control [9, 10, 11,
12], as a framework to RBNS model. However, we added some foundational work
to the RBAC model to tune it to be appropriate as a network security model.
1.2 Advantages of the Model
The main advantages of using the RBNS model are:
1. It allows the management of firewall configuration files in a higher level of ab-
straction. This decreases the probability of mistaken configured firewalls and
provides easier analysis and debugging of firewall configuration files.
2. It allows the separation of the security policy design from the firewall vendor
specifics. This allows a security administrator to focus on designing an appro-
priate policy without worrying about firewall rule complexity, and other low-
level configuration issues. It also enables a unified management of network
components from different vendors and a much easier transition when a company
switches vendors.
3. It allows the separation of the security policy design from the actual network
topology. This enables the administrator to maintain a consistent policy in
the face of Intranet topology changes. Furthermore, this modularization also
allows the administrator to reuse the same policy at multiple corporate sites with
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different network details, or to allow smaller companies to use default/exemplary
policies designed by experts.
1.3 Related Work
The work related to our problem is probably Firmato and Fang [8, 13]. Firmato
is a firewall management toolkit with: (1) an entity-relationship model containing
global knowledge of the security policy and topology, (2) a model definition lan-
guage, which is used as an interface to define an instance of the entity-relationship
model, (3) a model compiler, translating global knowledge of the model into firewall-
specific configuration files, and (4) a graphical firewall rules illustrator. However, the
transition from high-level to its abstracted model level is done through the model
definition language which seems complicated and needs hard effort. Also, it used an
entity relationship model that suffers from the following weaknesses:
• Mixing the concepts of roles and groups
• Making the roles as an attribute of capability entity whereas the capability entity
is assigned to roles. Besides hosts are attached to roles. This leads to difficult
and confusing assignment between hosts and services.
Besides, its compiler is tailored to the Lucent Managed Firewall. The kit does
not generate a general syntax of the rule-base that can be used with several firewalls.
Also, the kit focuses only on stateless packet filtering. Moreover, there is no effort
done to deal with more complicated security policy that assumes NAT technology or
needs checking of ACK bit. There is no effort done to verify the equivalence between
the high-level security policy and the corresponding low-level firewall configuration
files.
The Guttman’s work on filtering [14, 15] is also related to our work in the
sense that it introduced a language for expressing the network security policy as an
important step toward network security management. However, it does not provide
automatic generation of firewall rules or complete separation of the security policy
from the network topology.
Scott’s work [16] is also related to our work from the view that it wants to
maintain and validate firewall rule-base. It presents a new algorithm for represent-
ing firewall rule-base as a BDD (binary decision diagram) – a compact method of
representing and manipulating Boolean expressions – and then shows how the re-
sulting Boolean expression can be used to analyze rule sets. However, no effort is
done for applying this algorithm for automatic generation of firewall rule-base.
Role-based access control is our framework model. However, their focus is mostly
on assigning permissions to users (humans) of computing systems, whereas we deal
with assigning services to IP and with topology related issues.
On the other hand, our proposed model can be used directly to present the
high-level security policy. Our management kit provides a user friendly GUI to ac-
complish this task. Also, our proposed model introduces the concept of constraints
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to allow the presentation of more rigorous security policies that may contain pro-
tection against spoofing attack, ACK bit status checking, or even includes NAT
technology. In addition, a verification algorithm is proposed to verify the equiva-
lence between high-level policy and corresponding low-level firewall configuration
files.
1.4 Content and Structure of the Paper
Section 2 describes in details the RBNS model. With the aid of running example,
Section 2 illustrates how the high-level security policy can be represented by the
RBNS intermediate-level and how this intermediate-level is compiled to the low-level
firewall rule-base. Section 3 introduces an algorithm for verifying the equivalence
between high-level policy and the corresponding low-level firewall rule-base. Section
4 explains in brief our firewall management toolkit. Finally, Section 5 concludes the
paper and mentions possible extension of the work.
2 RBNS MODEL
This section presents detailed description of the RBNS model. It starts with brief
definition of the used terminology. Then, Section 2.2 introduces the concept and
the mathematical description of the base-RBNS model. Section 2.3 illustrates how
high-level security policy is defined using RBNS model entities. Then, Section 2.4
explains how the RBNS intermediate-level of the security policy is compiled to low-
level firewall rule-base. Section 2.5 describes an extension of the Base-RBNS model –
the constrained-RBNS model.
2.1 Terminology
Before the description of the model, we define precisely the following terms [5]:
Gateways These are the packets filtering machines, which can be either firewalls
or routers.
Interfaces By definition a gateway is multi-homed host, since it has at least two
Internet connections. Each connection goes through an interface, which has its
own unique IP address. We assume that each interface has a packet filtering the
rule-base associated with it. (This is more general than assuming only a single
rule-base per gateway).
Zones The gateways partition the IP address space into disjoint zones. Most zones
correspond to a corporation’s subnet(s), usually with one big “Internet” zone
corresponding to the portion of the IP address space that is not used by the
corporation.
82 A. A. Hassan, L. Hudec
2.2 Base-RBNS Model Description
The main concept of RBNS model is that services are associated with roles, and
hosts are assigned to appropriate roles thereby acquiring the roles’ network services.
RBNS model has two levels; the base-RBNS level and the constrained-RBNS level.
The base level is used to present primary security policy. If the security policy
assumes NAT technology, protection against spoofing attacks, ACK bit checking, or
other more rigorous security requirements, then the constrained-RBNS level has to
be used to present these more rigorous security requirements.
As shown in Figure 2, base-RBNS model, there are three sets of entities called


















Fig. 2. The RBNS model
A host entity models a machine on the network with its IP address. The host
entity represents the topology-related part on the model. It plays double parts
in the model: the host may appear as a source IP requesting a service (client-
host) or as a destination IP announcing which services can be supplied by it
(server-host).
A service entity is the combination of a protocol-base (e.g., TCP, UDP, etc.) and
the standard port numbers of that service. For instance, the service telnet is
defined as TCP with port number 23. These services are always positive and
confer the ability to the holder of the services to perform some actions on the
network.
A role is properly viewed as a semantic construct around which network security
policy is formulated. We have two types of roles; client-role and server-role.
Client-role intermediates a client-host to the network services permitted to that
host. Server-role intermediates a server-host to the network services supplied by
that host.
Also, Figure 2 shows the following relations:
Client-hosts assignment (CHA) defines the assignment between hosts and
client-roles.
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Server-hosts assignment (SHA) defines the assignment between hosts and ser-
ver-roles.
Client-services assignment (CSA) defines the assignment between services and
client-roles.
Server-services assignment (SSA) defines the assignment between services and
server-roles.
Role-role assignment (RRA) defines the assignment between client-roles and
server-roles.
The assignment between client-roles and server-roles enables the model to de-
fine a complete communication path between client-hosts that are made members
of a client-role (sources) and server-hosts that are made members of a server-role
(destinations).
All these relations are many-to-many relations. A host can be a member of
many roles and a role can have many hosts. Similarly, a role can have many services
and the same service can be assigned to many roles.
The key to RBNS model lies in these relations. The placement of a role as an
intermediary to enable a host to exercise a service provides much greater control
over rules’ configuration and review than does direct relating hosts to services like
host-based model.
The following definition formalizes the above discussion as:
Definition 1. The base-RBNS model has the following components:
• H,RC, RS, and S (hosts, client-roles, server-roles, and services, respectively).
• CSA ⊆ S ×RC , a many-to-many service to client-role assignment relation.
• SSA ⊆ S ×RS, a many-to-many service to server-role assignment relation.
• CHA ⊆ H ×RC , a many-to-many host to client-role assignment relation.
• SHA ⊆ H ×RS, a many-to-many host to server-role assignment relation.
• RRA ⊆ RC×RS, a many-to-many client- role to server-role assignment relation.
An important point to mention is that if some client-hosts are made members
in a client-role, these client-hosts will have the ability to perform the services owned
by this client-role on the network. However, a question arises: which hosts on the
network these client-hosts would be permitted to perform these services on them?
The answer to this questions lies on the role-to-role assignment relation. If there is
a client-role “A” assigned to server-role “B” then, the members of role “A” have the
ability to perform the common services between roles “A” and “B” on the members
of role “B”.
2.3 The Definition of High-Level Policy Using RBNS Notions
This section uses an example to illustrate how various entities of the RBNS model
can be used to define a concrete policy.
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For this purpose we consider a corporation with a two-firewall network configu-
ration as shown in Figure 3. The network is defined as a subnet 172.20.*.*. The



















Fig. 3. The network topology of the example
The external firewall (screening router) guards the corporation’s Internet con-
nection. Behind it is the DMZ (demilitarized zone), which contains the corporation’s
externally visible servers. In our case these servers provide web and SMTP services.
The corporation uses two hosts to provide these services, one for web and the other
for SMTP service. Behind the DMZ is the internal firewall (subnetting router),
which guards the corporation’s Intranet. This firewall actually has three interfaces:
one for the DMZ, one for the corporate users’ subnet, and a separate interface
connecting to the subnet of firewalls administrators. Securing the administrators
subnet is critical to the network’s integrity, so it is more appropriate to separate
their subnet from the other corporate hosts.
2.3.1 High-Level Policy Definition
We consider a simple high-level security policy which has the following goals:
1. All internal corporate hosts can access all Internet resources.
2. Corporate hosts and external hosts can access web server only with HTTP and
HTTPS services.
3. Corporate hosts and internet hosts can access mail server only with SMTP
service.
4. The firewall gateway interfaces are only accessible from the fw-admin. hosts.
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2.3.2 The Logical Procedure to Define the Model Entities
To present this high-level policy using RBNS model the network administrator needs
to define the various RBNS entities in frame of the logical procedure described in
Figure 4.
Define all Hosts 
Server Hosts Client Hosts 
Assignment of the  
similar server-hosts 
to a server-role 
Assignment of the 
required services to 
the corresponding 
server-role 
Client-Role to server-Role  
assignment 
Assignment of the  
similar client-hosts 
 to a client-role 
Assignment of the 




Define all needed 
services 
Define all needed 
server-roles 
Define all needed 
client-roles 
Fig. 4. Logical procedure for RBNS model entities definition
2.3.3 The RBNS Model Entities Definition
Within the above procedure the RBNS model entities corresponding to the running
example can be defined in the following steps:
Step 1: The definition of all needed network services
The first step is to define the various services according to the following syntax:
< service− name >′=′< protocol − base >′ [′< standard− port− number >′]′
According to the policy described above the following services are needed:
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http = TCP [80]
https = TCP [443]
smtp = TCP [25]
ssh = TCP [22]
ping = ICMP [8]
all-tcp= TCP [*]
Step 2: The definition and classification of all network hosts
All hosts listed in Figure 3 are defined and classified in Table 1.











Table 1. Network hosts definition and classification
Step 3: The definition of needed server-roles and client-roles










The meaning of roles is clear from their names.
Step 4: The assignment of hosts and services to the appropriate roles
Table 2 summarizes all roles with their host members and associated services.
Step 5: role-to-role assignment
The last step is to assign each client-role to the peer server-roles. Table 3 shows
each client-role with its peer server-roles.








R-external-users External-hosts http&https& smtp





Table 3. Role-to-role assignment
By the end of this step the high-level security policy is completely translated to
the RBNS intermediate level.
The next section illustrates how the RBNS intermediate level could be automa-
tically transferred to the low-level firewall configuration file.
2.4 RBNS model compiler
This section explains an algorithm to automatically compile the RBNS intermediate-
level of the security policy to the low-level firewall rules-base. The following pseudo
code defines the compilation algorithm for both stateless and stateful firewalls:
DOWHILE i <= no-of-client-roles {
DOWHILE j <= no-of-host-member-of-client-role-i {
rule-sourceIP-field = host-member-j-IP
if stateless filtering is considered add another return-rule with
return-rule-destinationIP-field = host-member-j-IP
DOWHILE k <= no-of-peer-server-roles-of-client-role-i {
Allowed services = common services between client-role-i and server-role-k
rule-protocol-field = base protocol of the service
rule-sourceport-field = (> 1023)
rule-destinationport-field = standard port of the service
if stateless filtering is considered add the following field to the return-rule {
return-rule-protocol-field = base protocol of the service
return-rule-sourceport-field = standard port of the service
return-rule-destinationport-field = (> 1023) }
DOWHILE l <= no-of-host-members-of-server-role-k {
rule-destinationIP-field = host-member-l-IP
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if stateless filtering is considered add the following field to the return-rule





Based on Tables 1, 2, and 3, the compilation algorithm could be applied on the
running example of Section 2.3 to generate the corresponding low-level firewall rules.
Table 4 presents a sample from these rules.
RuleNo. Source IP Dest. IP Protocol Source port Dest. port
1 172.20.2.*/24 172.20.1.4/32 tcp > 1023 80
2 172.20.2.*/24 172.20.1.1/32 icmp > 1023 8
3 172.20.2.*/24 *.*.*.*/0 tcp > 1023 *
4 172.20.3.*/24 172.20.1.4/32 tcp > 1023 443
5 172.20.3.*/24 172.20.1.5/32 tcp > 1023 25
6 *.*.*.*/0 172.20.1.4/32 tcp > 1023 80
7 *.*.*.*/0 172.20.1.5/32 tcp > 1023 25
Table 4. Low-level stateful firewall rules
If the compilation algorithm is applied to generate a stateless packet filter rules
the following rules would be obtained:
• The same rules defined in Table 4.
• Besides, another rule set corresponding to each rule in Table 4 to define the
response direction of the packet. A sample of these required rules is summarized
in Table 5.
RuleNo. Source IP Dest. IP Protocol Source port Dest. port
1’ 172.20.1.4/32 172.20.2.*/24 tcp 80 > 1023
2’ 172.20.1.1/32 172.20.2.*/24 icmp 8 > 1023
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 5. Extra low-level rules needed for stateless firewall
2.5 The Constrained-RBNS Model
Constrained-RBNS level introduces the concept of constraints to increase the capa-
bility of base-RBNS level to present more rigorous security policies that may con-
tain protection against spoofing attack, ACK bit status checking, or even includes
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Fig. 5. Constrained RBNS model
The constrained-RBNS is formally defined as:
Definition 2. Constrained-RBNS is unchanged from base-RBNS except for requir-
ing that there be a collection of constraints that enhance the ability of the model to
present more complicated high-level security policy.
Security requirements representation in the low-level differs from product to an-
other so, we define the constraints in the low-level by sentences in some appropriate
formal language. The remaining part of this section illustrates the anti-spoofing
attack constraints as an example.
The base-RBNS model can not present any rule of the high-level policy regarding
the protection against spoofing attacks. Spoofed packet is any packet comes on an
interface of the gateway claiming that it comes from another host. Without any
protection against this type of attack this spoofed packet will take all the services
associated to the roles in which the claimed IP is a member.
To reduce the possibility of spoofing attacks the constrained-RBNS model uses
some constraints. These constraints define the direction of the packet as shown in
Table 6.





Table 6. Anti-spoofing constraints
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The corresponding low-level rules to these constraints will be:
Source Destination Service Direction Action
Internal Any Any Outbound Pass
External Any Any Outbound Drop
Internal Any Any Inbound Drop
External Any Any Inbound Pass
These rules can be used in general case when the security policy deals with
spoofed packets coming on both sides of the firewall (subnetting firewall). However,
practically, spoofed packet is one which is coming from the internet into the corpo-
rate network with its source address belongs to one of the corporate addresses. In
this case the firewall uses one anti-spoofing rule that can be defined as:
Source Destination Service Direction Action
Internal Any Any Inbound Drop
Definition 3. The formal language presentation of the anti-spoofing constraints
can be stated as:
For all rules, accept packets iff (source IP and Interface IP are on the same
subnet).
3 VERIFICATION ALGORITHM
Verification involves developing formal description of the high-level network security
policy and proving that the implementation of this policy into low-level is equivalent
to the high-level one. This section starts with the explanation of a formal model
that describes the high-level security policy. Section 3.2 describes how rules can be
presented by Boolean expression. Section 3.3 illustrates the proposed verification
algorithm.
3.1 Formal Description of High-Level Network Security Policy
The high-level security policy can be formally described using the access control
matrix (ACM) [17]. In this case, the subjects of the ACM matrix correspond to
IPs of hosts requiring services on the network (client hosts) and the objects of the
matrix correspond to IPs of other hosts providing services on the network (server
hosts). The matrix decision rules have to specify the permitted services between the
subject IP and the Object IP.
The ACM matrix that describes the high-level policy defined in Section 2.3.1
could be as follows:


































3.2 Converting Rule Sets into Boolean Expressions
The key technique used is that numbers can be represented as bit vectors. For exam-
ple, an address segment is a number between 0 and 255. At a lower level, the address
segment is just a vector of 8 bits. For example, to represent the 8-bit number x sym-
bolically, we introduce the bit-vector<x7 , . . . , x0>, where each of the xis are Boolean
variables. The condition that the vector of x’s is equal to 3, is just <x7 , . . . , x0>=













2 , x1 , x0 , (bits 0 and 1 are high, the others low).
The key components in a rule are:
• The protocol of the packet: TCP, UDP or ICMP.
• The range of port numbers.
• The source address: four segments, each a number in the range 0. . . 255.
• The source address’s mask.
• The destination address (in the same format as the source).
• The destination address’s mask.
The remaining part of this section introduces a number of Boolean variables and
expressions to represent the information in the rule.
Each protocol is assigned a number 0, . . . , n − 1. These numbers can be rep-
resented in mn = log2n bits, and so we introduce pm variables <pm−1 , . . . , p0 >
to encode the protocol used. In the examples given below, the protocols can be
represented in 3 bits. For example, if the rule refers to a tcp protocol (protocol 3)
packet, then this is represented by the expression <p2 , p1 , p0>=<f , t , t>, or just
<p
/
2 , p1 , p0>.
For each segment of the source address we introduce 8 variables of the form
sax7 , . . . , sax0 , where x is the segment number. For example, if segment 2 of the





5 , sa24 , sa23 , sa22 , sa2
/
1 , sa20
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For each segment of the destination address we introduce 8 variables of the form
dax7 , . . . , dax0 , where x is the segment number. The encoding of destination ad-
dresses is similar to the encoding of the source address.
As there can be up to 64000 ports specified, port numbers can be represented
in 16 bits, so we introduce the Boolean vector <po15 , . . . , po0 > (with po15 being
the most significant bit) which encodes the port number. Using these variables it is
possible to represent individual ports as well as ranges of ports.
The main function of mask is to define the bits of the base address that should
be matched. To include the effect of masks in our proposed mechanism we can add
a simple function that extracts just the IP bits of the base address that should be
matched.
For example, consider the following rule:
Rule No. Source IP Destination IP Protocol Port
100 20.9.17.8/16 40.8.16.20/32 tcp 80
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It is also useful to note that the appearance of ”all” in certain field is encoded
in the expression by the absence of that field. For example, if we want to allow all
protocols then the vector < p2 , p1 , p0 > must be replaced by 1. This means that
this part is eliminated from the expression.
Using the methods described above the entire rule set can in principle be repre-
sented by a Boolean expression. The following algorithm [16] illustrates this:
• If the rule set is empty then no packets can be accepted and so the corresponding
Boolean expression is “f”.
• If the first rule is an accept rule then a packet will be accepted if it matches
the rule or if accepted by the rest of the rule set. So the corresponding Boolean
expression is the disjunction of the Boolean expression representing the first rule
and the Boolean expression representing the rest of the rules.
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• If the first rule is a reject rule then a packet will be accepted if it does not match
the first rule and it is accepted by the rest of the rule set. So the corresponding
Boolean expression is the conjunction of the negation of the Boolean expression
representing the first rule and the Boolean expression representing the rest of
the rules.
However, the RBNS model assumes the security policy (default == deny). In
this case all the rules should be of type ACCEPT. In this case the Boolean expression
that presents all the entire rule set is:
Exp 1 or (Exp 2 or (Exp 3 . . . or (Exp i . . .)))
where Exp i is the Boolean expression of the ith rule.
3.3 The Verification Algorithm
Our proposed verification algorithm, Figure 6, has three phases; the first phase is
to construct the ACM matrix that describes the high-level policy. Then, the matrix
entities are encoded to binary format. The second phase is to convert the low-level
entire rule set generated from the RBNS model to Boolean expression. In the third
phase all possible communication paths are extracted from the ACM matrix and are
substituted with their binary data into the Boolean expression of the second phase.
The verification decision is taken according to the following criteria:
1. If the Boolean expression results ONEs for all extracted communication paths
then the high-level policy is successfully implemented (regarding the accepted
traffic) in the low-level.
2. If the Boolean expression results ZEROs for some communication paths then
these paths are reported as absent paths. The low-level firewall rules have to be
changed in someway to accept these packets.
To ensure that there are no other communication paths without their definition
in the high-level policy the algorithm has to check all the remaining possibilities of
the Boolean expression (remaining 283 cases as we have 83 variables constituting the
Boolean expression). This number seems to be large; thus, the algorithm chooses
some random cases to check. In this case the verification decision is taken according
to the following criteria:
1. If the Boolean expression results ZEROs for all these paths then the high-level
policy is successfully implemented (regarding the denied traffic) in the low-level.
2. If the Boolean expression results ONEs for some communication paths then
these paths are reported as violation paths. The low-level firewall rules have to
be changed in some way to deny these packets.
The algorithm described above has been implemented in a prototype tool using
MatLab version 6.5. The algorithm has been tested on the same running example
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Construct the ACM 
matrix and encode the 
entities to binary format
Convert the low-level 
entire rule set to 
Boolean expression
Extract communication- 
path data from the ACM 




Substitute other random 
communication- path data 
(not included in the ACM 




Report it in 
the log file as 
absent path
Report it in 
the log file as 
violation path
Proceed until the end of 
tested communication paths 
0 1 0 1
Fig. 6. Verification algorithm flow chart
described in Section 2.3. A set of just 22 rules was converted into a Boolean expres-
sion. The all possible communication paths are extracted from the ACM matrix
and then substituted in the Boolean expression. Also, some other random commu-
nication paths are substituted in the Boolean expression. The log file of the tool
reported ONEs for all communication paths extracted from the ACM matrix veri-
fying the high-level policy is successfully implemented in the low-level. The log file
reported ZEROs for all other random communication paths verifying no violation
in the low-level rules.
4 CONFIGMAKER: A FIREWALL MANAGEMENT TOOLKIT
Based on RBNS model we have designed and implemented a firewall management
toolkit. ConfigMaker stands for configuration maker as the toolkit is used to auto-
matically generate the low-level firewall configuration rule-base from the high-level
security policy.
This section provides a brief description of the toolkit and its using. However, the
section concentrates mainly on how the RBNS model concepts are implemented and
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how the automatic translation from high-level security policy to low-level firewall
configuration rule-base is accomplished. The toolkit supports both stateless and
stateful firewalls. It supports ACK bit checking and NAT technology. Detailed
description of the toolkit is provided in [18, 19].












Fig. 7. Kit architecture
• GUI: through this graphical interface the administrator defines the RBNS enti-
ties and other topology related data, like firewalls’ interfaces IPs, that have to
be used to completely define the high-level security policy.
• Database: The database stores all entities data so that the administrator can
later modify any entity of the model.
• Compiler: The compiler interacts with the data base to automatically generate
the required security rules which are stored in output XML configuration file.
• XML configuration file: This file describes the firewall configuration that en-
forces the high-level security policy in a general syntax. General syntax means
that this syntax is not tailored for specific commercial firewall. However, the
XML file contains all the data required by most commercial firewall products.
• Specific-firewall interface: This interface module converts the XML configuration
file to specific commercial firewall configuration script. Currently the toolkit
supports two commercial firewall products – CISCO router and Linux kernel
firewall.
The dashed arrows clarify the dataflow in the toolkit.
4.1 Using the ConfigMaker
This section uses the same running example defined in Section 2.3 to illustrate with
the aid of some screen shots how the ConfigMaker toolkit can be used to trans-
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late high-level security policy into intermediate-level that can be compiled easily to
generate low-level firewall configuration file.
The toolkit user has to go through the following steps to define the RBNS
entities:
• Step 1 : hosts entity definition Figure 8.
• Step 2 : services entity definition.
• Step 3 : roles entity definition, Figure 9.
The assignment of hosts and services to roles are also accomplished through this
screen; Figure 9.
• Step 4 : role-to-role assignment
4.1.1 RBNS Model Compilation
To generate the XML configuration file the administrator chooses “compile DB to




















In this step the administrator can choose between various commercial firewalls to
generate its script configuration file. Actually, till now, our kit supports Cisco routers
and Linux kernel firewall. A sample of the generated script for Cisco routers is:
Management and Verification of Firewall and Router Access Lists 97
Fig. 8. Hosts definition
Fig. 9. Roles definition and assignment
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interface external
ip address 172.20.100.1 255.255.255.255
ip access-group 100 in
ip access-group 101 out
access-list 101 permit tcp host 172.20.2.0 0.0.0.255 host 0.0.0.0 255.255.255.255
range 0 65535 log
access-list 101 permit tcp host 172.20.3.0 0.0.0.255 host 0.0.0.0 255.255.255.255
range 0 65535 log
access-list 100 permit tcp host 0.0.0.0 255.255.255.255 host 172.20.1.4 0.0.0.0
eq 80 log
access-list 100 permit tcp host 0.0.0.0 255.255.255.255 host 172.20.1.4 0.0.0.0
eq 443 log
access-list 100 permit tcp host 0.0.0.0 255.255.255.255 host 172.20.1.5 0.0.0.0
eq 25 log
5 CONCLUSION
We have presented a role-based network security model. We discussed in detail the
various components of the model. Also, we introduced a mathematical formaliza-
tion of the model. We have presented the constrained-level of the RBNS model.
Constrained- RBNS level introduces the concept of constraints to represent a more
complicated security policy. A detailed running example is used throughout the
paper to illustrate the ability of our proposed model to be used as an intermediary-
level between high-level security policy and low-level firewall rule-base. We have
introduced a verification algorithm to verify the equivalence between high-level se-
curity policy and the corresponding low-level firewall configuration files. Finally we
have presented a design and implementation of ConfigMaker, a firewall management
toolkit based on RBNS model.
A more substantial extension to our work is to extend our model to upper layers
of network OSI model. Another important direction is to generalize the verification
algorithm to be used in the analysis of firewalls and routers access lists.
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